[CodeGen] Inline stack guard check on Windows (#136290)

This patch optimizes the Windows security cookie check mechanism by
moving the comparison inline and only calling __security_check_cookie
when the check fails. This reduces the overhead of making a DLL call 
for every function return.

Previously, we implemented this optimization through a machine pass
(X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass) in PR #95904 submitted by
@mahesh-attarde. We have reverted that pass in favor of this new 
approach. Also we have abandoned the AArch64 specific implementation 
of same pass in PR #121938 in favor of this more general solution.

The old machine instruction pass approach:
- Scanned the generated code to find __security_check_cookie calls
- Modified these calls by splitting basic blocks
- Added comparison logic and conditional branching
- Required complex block management and live register computation

The new approach:
- Implements the same optimization during instruction selection
- Directly emits the comparison and conditional branching
- No need for post-processing or basic block manipulation
- Disables optimization at -Oz.

Thanks @tamaspetz, @efriedma-quic and @arsenm for their help.
This commit is contained in:
Omair Javaid
2025-06-12 19:38:42 +05:00
committed by GitHub
parent cc17f68e56
commit e1e1836bbd
12 changed files with 333 additions and 313 deletions

View File

@@ -3037,8 +3037,9 @@ void SelectionDAGBuilder::visitSPDescriptorParent(StackProtectorDescriptor &SPD,
// First create the loads to the guard/stack slot for the comparison.
const TargetLowering &TLI = DAG.getTargetLoweringInfo();
EVT PtrTy = TLI.getPointerTy(DAG.getDataLayout());
EVT PtrMemTy = TLI.getPointerMemTy(DAG.getDataLayout());
auto &DL = DAG.getDataLayout();
EVT PtrTy = TLI.getFrameIndexTy(DL);
EVT PtrMemTy = TLI.getPointerMemTy(DL, DL.getAllocaAddrSpace());
MachineFrameInfo &MFI = ParentBB->getParent()->getFrameInfo();
int FI = MFI.getStackProtectorIndex();
@@ -3047,8 +3048,8 @@ void SelectionDAGBuilder::visitSPDescriptorParent(StackProtectorDescriptor &SPD,
SDLoc dl = getCurSDLoc();
SDValue StackSlotPtr = DAG.getFrameIndex(FI, PtrTy);
const Module &M = *ParentBB->getParent()->getFunction().getParent();
Align Align =
DAG.getDataLayout().getPrefTypeAlign(PointerType::get(M.getContext(), 0));
Align Align = DL.getPrefTypeAlign(
PointerType::get(M.getContext(), DL.getAllocaAddrSpace()));
// Generate code to load the content of the guard slot.
SDValue GuardVal = DAG.getLoad(
@@ -3059,8 +3060,14 @@ void SelectionDAGBuilder::visitSPDescriptorParent(StackProtectorDescriptor &SPD,
if (TLI.useStackGuardXorFP())
GuardVal = TLI.emitStackGuardXorFP(DAG, GuardVal, dl);
// Retrieve guard check function, nullptr if instrumentation is inlined.
if (const Function *GuardCheckFn = TLI.getSSPStackGuardCheck(M)) {
// If we're using function-based instrumentation, call the guard check
// function
if (SPD.shouldEmitFunctionBasedCheckStackProtector()) {
// Get the guard check function from the target and verify it exists since
// we're using function-based instrumentation
const Function *GuardCheckFn = TLI.getSSPStackGuardCheck(M);
assert(GuardCheckFn && "Guard check function is null");
// The target provides a guard check function to validate the guard value.
// Generate a call to that function with the content of the guard slot as
// argument.
@@ -3101,10 +3108,9 @@ void SelectionDAGBuilder::visitSPDescriptorParent(StackProtectorDescriptor &SPD,
}
// Perform the comparison via a getsetcc.
SDValue Cmp = DAG.getSetCC(dl, TLI.getSetCCResultType(DAG.getDataLayout(),
*DAG.getContext(),
Guard.getValueType()),
Guard, GuardVal, ISD::SETNE);
SDValue Cmp = DAG.getSetCC(
dl, TLI.getSetCCResultType(DL, *DAG.getContext(), Guard.getValueType()),
Guard, GuardVal, ISD::SETNE);
// If the guard/stackslot do not equal, branch to failure MBB.
SDValue BrCond = DAG.getNode(ISD::BRCOND, dl,
@@ -3126,14 +3132,69 @@ void SelectionDAGBuilder::visitSPDescriptorParent(StackProtectorDescriptor &SPD,
/// For a high level explanation of how this fits into the stack protector
/// generation see the comment on the declaration of class
/// StackProtectorDescriptor.
void
SelectionDAGBuilder::visitSPDescriptorFailure(StackProtectorDescriptor &SPD) {
void SelectionDAGBuilder::visitSPDescriptorFailure(
StackProtectorDescriptor &SPD) {
const TargetLowering &TLI = DAG.getTargetLoweringInfo();
TargetLowering::MakeLibCallOptions CallOptions;
CallOptions.setDiscardResult(true);
SDValue Chain = TLI.makeLibCall(DAG, RTLIB::STACKPROTECTOR_CHECK_FAIL,
MVT::isVoid, {}, CallOptions, getCurSDLoc())
.second;
MachineBasicBlock *ParentBB = SPD.getParentMBB();
const Module &M = *ParentBB->getParent()->getFunction().getParent();
SDValue Chain;
// For -Oz builds with a guard check function, we use function-based
// instrumentation. Otherwise, if we have a guard check function, we call it
// in the failure block.
auto *GuardCheckFn = TLI.getSSPStackGuardCheck(M);
if (GuardCheckFn && !SPD.shouldEmitFunctionBasedCheckStackProtector()) {
// First create the loads to the guard/stack slot for the comparison.
auto &DL = DAG.getDataLayout();
EVT PtrTy = TLI.getFrameIndexTy(DL);
EVT PtrMemTy = TLI.getPointerMemTy(DL, DL.getAllocaAddrSpace());
MachineFrameInfo &MFI = ParentBB->getParent()->getFrameInfo();
int FI = MFI.getStackProtectorIndex();
SDLoc dl = getCurSDLoc();
SDValue StackSlotPtr = DAG.getFrameIndex(FI, PtrTy);
Align Align = DL.getPrefTypeAlign(
PointerType::get(M.getContext(), DL.getAllocaAddrSpace()));
// Generate code to load the content of the guard slot.
SDValue GuardVal = DAG.getLoad(
PtrMemTy, dl, DAG.getEntryNode(), StackSlotPtr,
MachinePointerInfo::getFixedStack(DAG.getMachineFunction(), FI), Align,
MachineMemOperand::MOVolatile);
if (TLI.useStackGuardXorFP())
GuardVal = TLI.emitStackGuardXorFP(DAG, GuardVal, dl);
// The target provides a guard check function to validate the guard value.
// Generate a call to that function with the content of the guard slot as
// argument.
FunctionType *FnTy = GuardCheckFn->getFunctionType();
assert(FnTy->getNumParams() == 1 && "Invalid function signature");
TargetLowering::ArgListTy Args;
TargetLowering::ArgListEntry Entry;
Entry.Node = GuardVal;
Entry.Ty = FnTy->getParamType(0);
if (GuardCheckFn->hasParamAttribute(0, Attribute::AttrKind::InReg))
Entry.IsInReg = true;
Args.push_back(Entry);
TargetLowering::CallLoweringInfo CLI(DAG);
CLI.setDebugLoc(getCurSDLoc())
.setChain(DAG.getEntryNode())
.setCallee(GuardCheckFn->getCallingConv(), FnTy->getReturnType(),
getValue(GuardCheckFn), std::move(Args));
Chain = TLI.LowerCallTo(CLI).second;
} else {
TargetLowering::MakeLibCallOptions CallOptions;
CallOptions.setDiscardResult(true);
Chain = TLI.makeLibCall(DAG, RTLIB::STACKPROTECTOR_CHECK_FAIL, MVT::isVoid,
{}, CallOptions, getCurSDLoc())
.second;
}
// Emit a trap instruction if we are required to do so.
const TargetOptions &TargetOpts = DAG.getTarget().Options;

View File

@@ -1877,7 +1877,7 @@ void SelectionDAGISel::SelectAllBasicBlocks(const Function &Fn) {
if (SP->shouldEmitSDCheck(*LLVMBB)) {
bool FunctionBasedInstrumentation =
TLI->getSSPStackGuardCheck(*Fn.getParent());
TLI->getSSPStackGuardCheck(*Fn.getParent()) && Fn.hasMinSize();
SDB->SPDescriptor.initialize(LLVMBB, FuncInfo->getMBB(LLVMBB),
FunctionBasedInstrumentation);
}
@@ -1950,8 +1950,7 @@ SelectionDAGISel::FinishBasicBlock() {
// Add load and check to the basicblock.
FuncInfo->MBB = ParentMBB;
FuncInfo->InsertPt =
findSplitPointForStackProtector(ParentMBB, *TII);
FuncInfo->InsertPt = findSplitPointForStackProtector(ParentMBB, *TII);
SDB->visitSPDescriptorParent(SDB->SPDescriptor, ParentMBB);
CurDAG->setRoot(SDB->getRoot());
SDB->clear();
@@ -1973,8 +1972,7 @@ SelectionDAGISel::FinishBasicBlock() {
findSplitPointForStackProtector(ParentMBB, *TII);
// Splice the terminator of ParentMBB into SuccessMBB.
SuccessMBB->splice(SuccessMBB->end(), ParentMBB,
SplitPoint,
SuccessMBB->splice(SuccessMBB->end(), ParentMBB, SplitPoint,
ParentMBB->end());
// Add compare/jump on neq/jump to the parent BB.

View File

@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ set(sources
X86VZeroUpper.cpp
X86WinEHState.cpp
X86WinEHUnwindV2.cpp
X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheck.cpp
X86InsertWait.cpp
GISel/X86CallLowering.cpp
GISel/X86InstructionSelector.cpp

View File

@@ -73,9 +73,6 @@ FunctionPass *createX86OptimizeLEAs();
/// Return a pass that transforms setcc + movzx pairs into xor + setcc.
FunctionPass *createX86FixupSetCC();
/// Return a pass that transform inline buffer security check into seperate bb
FunctionPass *createX86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass();
/// Return a pass that avoids creating store forward block issues in the hardware.
FunctionPass *createX86AvoidStoreForwardingBlocks();
@@ -195,7 +192,6 @@ void initializeX86ExpandPseudoPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86FastPreTileConfigPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86FastTileConfigPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86FixupSetCCPassPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPassPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86FlagsCopyLoweringPassPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86LoadValueInjectionLoadHardeningPassPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86LoadValueInjectionRetHardeningPassPass(PassRegistry &);

View File

@@ -554,7 +554,6 @@ bool X86PassConfig::addPreISel() {
void X86PassConfig::addPreRegAlloc() {
if (getOptLevel() != CodeGenOptLevel::None) {
addPass(&LiveRangeShrinkID);
addPass(createX86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass());
addPass(createX86FixupSetCC());
addPass(createX86OptimizeLEAs());
addPass(createX86CallFrameOptimization());

View File

@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
//===- X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheck.cpp Fix Buffer Security Check Call -===//
//
// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
// Buffer Security Check implementation inserts windows specific callback into
// code. On windows, __security_check_cookie call gets call everytime function
// is return without fixup. Since this function is defined in runtime library,
// it incures cost of call in dll which simply does comparison and returns most
// time. With Fixup, We selective move to call in DLL only if comparison fails.
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
#include "X86.h"
#include "X86FrameLowering.h"
#include "X86InstrInfo.h"
#include "X86Subtarget.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/LivePhysRegs.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineFunctionPass.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineInstrBuilder.h"
#include "llvm/IR/Module.h"
using namespace llvm;
#define DEBUG_TYPE "x86-win-fixup-bscheck"
namespace {
class X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass : public MachineFunctionPass {
public:
static char ID;
X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass() : MachineFunctionPass(ID) {}
StringRef getPassName() const override {
return "X86 Windows Fixup Buffer Security Check";
}
bool runOnMachineFunction(MachineFunction &MF) override;
std::pair<MachineBasicBlock *, MachineInstr *>
getSecurityCheckerBasicBlock(MachineFunction &MF);
void getGuardCheckSequence(MachineBasicBlock *CurMBB, MachineInstr *CheckCall,
MachineInstr *SeqMI[5]);
void SplitBasicBlock(MachineBasicBlock *CurMBB, MachineBasicBlock *NewRetMBB,
MachineBasicBlock::iterator SplitIt);
void FinishBlock(MachineBasicBlock *MBB);
void FinishFunction(MachineBasicBlock *FailMBB, MachineBasicBlock *NewRetMBB);
std::pair<MachineInstr *, MachineInstr *>
CreateFailCheckSequence(MachineBasicBlock *CurMBB, MachineBasicBlock *FailMBB,
MachineInstr *SeqMI[5]);
};
} // end anonymous namespace
char X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::ID = 0;
INITIALIZE_PASS(X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass, DEBUG_TYPE, DEBUG_TYPE,
false, false)
FunctionPass *llvm::createX86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass() {
return new X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass();
}
void X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::SplitBasicBlock(
MachineBasicBlock *CurMBB, MachineBasicBlock *NewRetMBB,
MachineBasicBlock::iterator SplitIt) {
NewRetMBB->splice(NewRetMBB->end(), CurMBB, SplitIt, CurMBB->end());
}
std::pair<MachineBasicBlock *, MachineInstr *>
X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::getSecurityCheckerBasicBlock(
MachineFunction &MF) {
MachineBasicBlock::reverse_iterator RBegin, REnd;
for (auto &MBB : llvm::reverse(MF)) {
for (RBegin = MBB.rbegin(), REnd = MBB.rend(); RBegin != REnd; ++RBegin) {
auto &MI = *RBegin;
if (MI.getOpcode() == X86::CALL64pcrel32 &&
MI.getNumExplicitOperands() == 1) {
auto MO = MI.getOperand(0);
if (MO.isGlobal()) {
auto Callee = dyn_cast<Function>(MO.getGlobal());
if (Callee && Callee->getName() == "__security_check_cookie") {
return std::make_pair(&MBB, &MI);
break;
}
}
}
}
}
return std::make_pair(nullptr, nullptr);
}
void X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::getGuardCheckSequence(
MachineBasicBlock *CurMBB, MachineInstr *CheckCall,
MachineInstr *SeqMI[5]) {
MachineBasicBlock::iterator UIt(CheckCall);
MachineBasicBlock::reverse_iterator DIt(CheckCall);
// Seq From StackUp to Stack Down Is fixed.
// ADJCALLSTACKUP64
++UIt;
SeqMI[4] = &*UIt;
// CALL __security_check_cookie
SeqMI[3] = CheckCall;
// COPY function slot cookie
++DIt;
SeqMI[2] = &*DIt;
// ADJCALLSTACKDOWN64
++DIt;
SeqMI[1] = &*DIt;
MachineBasicBlock::reverse_iterator XIt(SeqMI[1]);
for (; XIt != CurMBB->rbegin(); ++XIt) {
auto &CI = *XIt;
if ((CI.getOpcode() == X86::XOR64_FP) || (CI.getOpcode() == X86::XOR32_FP))
break;
}
SeqMI[0] = &*XIt;
}
std::pair<MachineInstr *, MachineInstr *>
X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::CreateFailCheckSequence(
MachineBasicBlock *CurMBB, MachineBasicBlock *FailMBB,
MachineInstr *SeqMI[5]) {
auto MF = CurMBB->getParent();
Module &M = *MF->getFunction().getParent();
GlobalVariable *GV = M.getGlobalVariable("__security_cookie");
assert(GV && " Security Cookie was not installed!");
const TargetInstrInfo *TII = MF->getSubtarget().getInstrInfo();
MachineInstr *GuardXor = SeqMI[0];
MachineBasicBlock::iterator InsertPt(GuardXor);
++InsertPt;
// Compare security_Cookie with XOR_Val, if not same, we have violation
auto CMI = BuildMI(*CurMBB, InsertPt, DebugLoc(), TII->get(X86::CMP64rm))
.addReg(GuardXor->getOperand(0).getReg())
.addReg(X86::RIP)
.addImm(1)
.addReg(X86::NoRegister)
.addGlobalAddress(GV)
.addReg(X86::NoRegister);
BuildMI(*CurMBB, InsertPt, DebugLoc(), TII->get(X86::JCC_1))
.addMBB(FailMBB)
.addImm(X86::COND_NE);
auto JMI = BuildMI(*CurMBB, InsertPt, DebugLoc(), TII->get(X86::JMP_1));
return std::make_pair(CMI.getInstr(), JMI.getInstr());
}
void X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::FinishBlock(MachineBasicBlock *MBB) {
LivePhysRegs LiveRegs;
computeAndAddLiveIns(LiveRegs, *MBB);
}
void X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::FinishFunction(
MachineBasicBlock *FailMBB, MachineBasicBlock *NewRetMBB) {
FailMBB->getParent()->RenumberBlocks();
// FailMBB includes call to MSCV RT where is __security_check_cookie
// function is called. This function uses regcall and it expects cookie
// value from stack slot.( even if this is modified)
// Before going further we compute back livein for this block to make sure
// it is live and provided.
FinishBlock(FailMBB);
FinishBlock(NewRetMBB);
}
bool X86WinFixupBufferSecurityCheckPass::runOnMachineFunction(
MachineFunction &MF) {
bool Changed = false;
const X86Subtarget &STI = MF.getSubtarget<X86Subtarget>();
if (!(STI.isTargetWindowsItanium() || STI.isTargetWindowsMSVC()))
return Changed;
// Check if security cookie was installed or not
Module &M = *MF.getFunction().getParent();
GlobalVariable *GV = M.getGlobalVariable("__security_cookie");
if (!GV)
return Changed;
const TargetInstrInfo *TII = MF.getSubtarget().getInstrInfo();
// Check if security check cookie was installed or not
auto [CurMBB, CheckCall] = getSecurityCheckerBasicBlock(MF);
if (!CheckCall)
return Changed;
MachineBasicBlock *FailMBB = MF.CreateMachineBasicBlock();
MachineBasicBlock *NewRetMBB = MF.CreateMachineBasicBlock();
MF.insert(MF.end(), NewRetMBB);
MF.insert(MF.end(), FailMBB);
MachineInstr *SeqMI[5];
getGuardCheckSequence(CurMBB, CheckCall, SeqMI);
// MachineInstr * GuardXor = SeqMI[0];
auto FailSeqRange = CreateFailCheckSequence(CurMBB, FailMBB, SeqMI);
MachineInstrBuilder JMI(MF, FailSeqRange.second);
// After Inserting JMP_1, we can not have two terminators
// in same block, split CurrentMBB after JMP_1
MachineBasicBlock::iterator SplitIt(SeqMI[4]);
++SplitIt;
SplitBasicBlock(CurMBB, NewRetMBB, SplitIt);
// Fill up Failure Routine, move Fail Check Squence from CurMBB to FailMBB
MachineBasicBlock::iterator U1It(SeqMI[1]);
MachineBasicBlock::iterator U2It(SeqMI[4]);
++U2It;
FailMBB->splice(FailMBB->end(), CurMBB, U1It, U2It);
BuildMI(*FailMBB, FailMBB->end(), DebugLoc(), TII->get(X86::INT3));
// Move left over instruction after StackUp
// from Current Basic BLocks into New Return Block
JMI.addMBB(NewRetMBB);
MachineBasicBlock::iterator SplicePt(JMI.getInstr());
++SplicePt;
if (SplicePt != CurMBB->end())
NewRetMBB->splice(NewRetMBB->end(), CurMBB, SplicePt);
// Restructure Basic Blocks
CurMBB->addSuccessor(NewRetMBB);
CurMBB->addSuccessor(FailMBB);
FinishFunction(FailMBB, NewRetMBB);
return !Changed;
}

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@@ -17,8 +17,12 @@ define void @caller() sspreq {
; CHECK-NEXT: ldr x8, [x8, :lo12:__security_cookie]
; CHECK-NEXT: str x8, [sp, #8]
; CHECK-NEXT: bl callee
; CHECK-NEXT: ldr x0, [sp, #8]
; CHECK-NEXT: bl __security_check_cookie
; CHECK-NEXT: adrp x8, __security_cookie
; CHECK-NEXT: ldr x9, [sp, #8]
; CHECK-NEXT: ldr x8, [x8, :lo12:__security_cookie]
; CHECK-NEXT: cmp x8, x9
; CHECK-NEXT: b.ne .LBB0_2
; CHECK-NEXT: // %bb.1: // %entry
; CHECK-NEXT: .seh_startepilogue
; CHECK-NEXT: ldr x30, [sp, #16] // 8-byte Folded Reload
; CHECK-NEXT: .seh_save_reg x30, 16
@@ -26,6 +30,10 @@ define void @caller() sspreq {
; CHECK-NEXT: .seh_stackalloc 32
; CHECK-NEXT: .seh_endepilogue
; CHECK-NEXT: ret
; CHECK-NEXT: .LBB0_2: // %entry
; CHECK-NEXT: ldr x0, [sp, #8]
; CHECK-NEXT: bl __security_check_cookie
; CHECK-NEXT: brk #0x1
; CHECK-NEXT: .seh_endfunclet
; CHECK-NEXT: .seh_endproc
entry:

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@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@
; CHECK-NEXT: Peephole Optimizations
; CHECK-NEXT: Remove dead machine instructions
; CHECK-NEXT: Live Range Shrink
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Windows Fixup Buffer Security Check
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 Fixup SetCC
; CHECK-NEXT: Lazy Machine Block Frequency Analysis
; CHECK-NEXT: X86 LEA Optimize

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@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
; NOTE: Assertions have been autogenerated by utils/update_llc_test_checks.py UTC_ARGS: --version 5
; RUN: llc -mtriple=i386-pc-windows-msvc < %s -o - | FileCheck -check-prefix=MSVC-X86 %s
; RUN: llc -mtriple=x86_64-pc-windows-msvc < %s -o - | FileCheck -check-prefix=MSVC-X64 %s
; Make sure fastisel falls back and does something secure.
; RUN: llc -mtriple=i686-pc-windows-msvc -O0 < %s -o - | FileCheck -check-prefix=MSVC-X86-O0 %s
; RUN: llc -mtriple=x86_64-pc-windows-msvc -O0 < %s -o - | FileCheck -check-prefix=MSVC-X64-O0 %s
@"\01LC" = internal constant [11 x i8] c"buf == %s\0A\00" ; <ptr> [#uses=1]
define void @test(ptr %a) nounwind ssp minsize {
; MSVC-X86-LABEL: test:
; MSVC-X86: # %bb.0: # %entry
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl %esi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: subl $12, %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %esp, %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl %eax, {{[0-9]+}}(%esp)
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl %esp, %esi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp)
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl %esi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll _strcpy
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %edx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl %esi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl $LC
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll _printf
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %edx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %esp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: addl $12, %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %esi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: retl
;
; MSVC-X64-LABEL: test:
; MSVC-X64: # %bb.0: # %entry
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: pushq %rsi
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: subq $64, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rcx, %rdx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rax, {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp)
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rcx, {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp)
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: leaq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rsi
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rsi, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq strcpy
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: leaq LC(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rsi, %rdx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq printf
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: addq $64, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: popq %rsi
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: retq
;
; MSVC-X86-O0-LABEL: test:
; MSVC-X86-O0: # %bb.0: # %entry
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: subl $20, %esp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %esp, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl %eax, {{[0-9]+}}(%esp)
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl %esp, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl %ecx, 4(%eax)
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: leal {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl %ecx, (%eax)
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: calll _strcpy
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: leal LC, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: leal {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl %ecx, (%esp)
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl %eax, {{[0-9]+}}(%esp)
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: calll _printf
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: # %bb.1: # %return
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %esp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: addl $20, %esp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: retl
;
; MSVC-X64-O0-LABEL: test:
; MSVC-X64-O0: # %bb.0: # %entry
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: subq $56, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq %rax, {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp)
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq %rcx, {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp)
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rdx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: leaq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: callq strcpy
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: leaq LC(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: leaq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rdx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: callq printf
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: # %bb.1: # %return
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: addq $56, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: retq
entry:
%a_addr = alloca ptr ; <ptr> [#uses=2]
%buf = alloca [8 x i8] ; <ptr> [#uses=2]
store ptr %a, ptr %a_addr
%0 = load ptr, ptr %a_addr, align 4 ; <ptr> [#uses=1]
%1 = call ptr @strcpy(ptr %buf, ptr %0) nounwind ; <ptr> [#uses=0]
%2 = call i32 (ptr, ...) @printf(ptr @"\01LC", ptr %buf) nounwind ; <i32> [#uses=0]
br label %return
return: ; preds = %entry
ret void
}
declare ptr @strcpy(ptr, ptr) nounwind
declare i32 @printf(ptr, ...) nounwind

View File

@@ -25,12 +25,19 @@ define void @test(ptr %a) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl $LC
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll _printf
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: addl $8, %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %esp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %esp, %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: cmpl %eax, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: jne LBB0_2
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: # %bb.1: # %return
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: addl $12, %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %esi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: retl
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: LBB0_2: # %return
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %esp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
;
; MSVC-X64-LABEL: test:
; MSVC-X64: # %bb.0: # %entry
@@ -47,17 +54,19 @@ define void @test(ptr %a) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: leaq LC(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rsi, %rdx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq printf
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: cmpq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: cmpq %rax, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: jne .LBB0_2
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: # %bb.1:
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: # %bb.1: # %return
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: addq $64, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: popq %rsi
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: retq
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: .LBB0_2:
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: .LBB0_2: # %return
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: int3
;
; MSVC-X86-O0-LABEL: test:
; MSVC-X86-O0: # %bb.0: # %entry
@@ -80,7 +89,15 @@ define void @test(ptr %a) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: # %bb.1: # %return
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %esp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: subl %ecx, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: jne LBB0_3
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: jmp LBB0_2
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: LBB0_3: # %return
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl {{[0-9]+}}(%esp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %esp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: LBB0_2: # %return
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: addl $20, %esp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: retl
;
@@ -100,9 +117,18 @@ define void @test(ptr %a) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: # %bb.1: # %return
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: subq %rcx, %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: jne .LBB0_3
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: jmp .LBB0_2
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: .LBB0_3: # %return
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: .LBB0_2: # %return
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: addq $56, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: retq
entry:
%a_addr = alloca ptr ; <ptr> [#uses=2]
%buf = alloca [8 x i8] ; <ptr> [#uses=2]
@@ -134,12 +160,19 @@ define void @test_vla(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll _escape
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: addl $4, %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl -4(%ebp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl -4(%ebp), %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: cmpl %eax, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: jne LBB1_2
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: # %bb.1:
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl %ebp, %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %ebp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: retl
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: LBB1_2:
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl -4(%ebp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
;
; MSVC-X64-LABEL: test_vla:
; MSVC-X64: # %bb.0:
@@ -158,19 +191,20 @@ define void @test_vla(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: subq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq escape
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: addq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq -8(%rbp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: cmpq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq -8(%rbp), %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: cmpq %rax, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: jne .LBB1_2
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: # %bb.1:
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rbp, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: popq %rbp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: retq
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: .LBB1_2:
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq -8(%rbp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: subq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: addq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: int3
;
; MSVC-X86-O0-LABEL: test_vla:
; MSVC-X86-O0: # %bb.0:
@@ -190,7 +224,15 @@ define void @test_vla(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: addl $4, %esp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl -4(%ebp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: subl %ecx, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: jne LBB1_2
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: jmp LBB1_1
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: LBB1_2:
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl -4(%ebp), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: LBB1_1:
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl %ebp, %esp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: popl %ebp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: retl
@@ -215,8 +257,16 @@ define void @test_vla(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: addq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq -8(%rbp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: subq %rcx, %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: jne .LBB1_2
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: jmp .LBB1_1
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: .LBB1_2:
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq -8(%rbp), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: subq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: .LBB1_1:
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq %rbp, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: popq %rbp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: retq
@@ -253,14 +303,21 @@ define void @test_vla_realign(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: pushl %edi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll _escape
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: addl $4, %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl 12(%esi), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl 12(%esi), %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %eax
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: cmpl %eax, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: jne LBB2_2
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: # %bb.1:
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: leal -8(%ebp), %esp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %esi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %edi
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: popl %ebp
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: retl
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: LBB2_2:
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: movl 12(%esi), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
;
; MSVC-X64-LABEL: test_vla_realign:
; MSVC-X64: # %bb.0:
@@ -286,9 +343,10 @@ define void @test_vla_realign(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rsi, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq escape
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: addq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq 24(%rbx), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: cmpq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq 24(%rbx), %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rax
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: cmpq %rax, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: jne .LBB2_2
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: # %bb.1:
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq %rbp, %rsp
@@ -297,10 +355,10 @@ define void @test_vla_realign(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: popq %rbp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: retq
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: .LBB2_2:
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: movq 24(%rbx), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: subq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: addq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-NEXT: int3
;
; MSVC-X86-O0-LABEL: test_vla_realign:
; MSVC-X86-O0: # %bb.0:
@@ -328,7 +386,15 @@ define void @test_vla_realign(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: addl $4, %esp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl 48(%esi), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl ___security_cookie, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: subl %ecx, %eax
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: jne LBB2_2
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: jmp LBB2_1
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: LBB2_2:
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: movl 48(%esi), %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: xorl %ebp, %ecx
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: LBB2_1:
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: leal -4(%ebp), %esp
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: popl %esi
; MSVC-X86-O0-NEXT: popl %ebp
@@ -361,8 +427,16 @@ define void @test_vla_realign(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: addq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq 64(%rbx), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: subq %rcx, %rax
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: jne .LBB2_2
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: jmp .LBB2_1
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: .LBB2_2:
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: movq 64(%rbx), %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: xorq %rbp, %rcx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: subq $32, %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: .LBB2_1:
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: leaq 8(%rbp), %rsp
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: popq %rbx
; MSVC-X64-O0-NEXT: popq %rbp
@@ -377,3 +451,4 @@ define void @test_vla_realign(i32 %n) nounwind ssp {
declare ptr @strcpy(ptr, ptr) nounwind
declare i32 @printf(ptr, ...) nounwind

View File

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@ define tailcc void @tailcall_frame(ptr %0, i64 %1) sspreq {
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq %rax, {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp)
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: cmpq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: cmpq %rax, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: jne .LBB0_1
; WINDOWS-NEXT: # %bb.2:
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorl %ecx, %ecx
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@ define tailcc void @tailcall_frame(ptr %0, i64 %1) sspreq {
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_endepilogue
; WINDOWS-NEXT: jmp h # TAILCALL
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .LBB0_1:
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; WINDOWS-NEXT: int3
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_endproc
@@ -49,7 +52,6 @@ define tailcc void @tailcall_frame(ptr %0, i64 %1) sspreq {
; LINUX-NEXT: .LBB0_2: # %CallStackCheckFailBlk
; LINUX-NEXT: .cfi_def_cfa_offset 32
; LINUX-NEXT: callq __stack_chk_fail@PLT
tail call tailcc void @h(ptr null, i64 0, ptr null)
ret void
}
@@ -65,9 +67,10 @@ define void @tailcall_unrelated_frame() sspreq {
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq %rax, {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp)
; WINDOWS-NEXT: callq bar
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: cmpq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: cmpq %rax, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: jne .LBB1_1
; WINDOWS-NEXT: # %bb.2:
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_startepilogue
@@ -75,6 +78,8 @@ define void @tailcall_unrelated_frame() sspreq {
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_endepilogue
; WINDOWS-NEXT: jmp bar # TAILCALL
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .LBB1_1:
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; WINDOWS-NEXT: int3
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_endproc
@@ -115,9 +120,10 @@ define void @caller() sspreq {
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq %rax, {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp)
; WINDOWS-NEXT: callq callee
; WINDOWS-NEXT: callq callee
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: cmpq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rax
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq __security_cookie(%rip), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: cmpq %rax, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: jne .LBB2_2
; WINDOWS-NEXT: # %bb.1:
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_startepilogue
@@ -125,6 +131,8 @@ define void @caller() sspreq {
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_endepilogue
; WINDOWS-NEXT: retq
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .LBB2_2:
; WINDOWS-NEXT: movq {{[0-9]+}}(%rsp), %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: xorq %rsp, %rcx
; WINDOWS-NEXT: callq __security_check_cookie
; WINDOWS-NEXT: int3
; WINDOWS-NEXT: .seh_endproc

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
; CHECK: subl $20, %esp
; CHECK: .cv_fpo_stackalloc 20
; CHECK: .cv_fpo_endprologue
; CHECK: ___security_cookie
; CHECK: movl ___security_cookie, %ea
; CHECK: movl 28(%esp), %esi
; CHECK: movl %esi, {{[0-9]*}}(%esp)
@@ -24,13 +24,16 @@
; CHECK: movl %esi, {{[0-9]*}}(%esp)
; CHECK: calll _escape
; CHECK: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; CHECK: movl ___security_cookie, %ecx
; CHECK: cmpl %eax, %ecx
; CHECK: movl %esi, %eax
; CHECK: addl $20, %esp
; CHECK: popl %esi
; CHECK: retl
; CHECK: Ltmp4:
; CHECK: calll @__security_check_cookie@4
; CHECK: .cv_fpo_endproc
; ModuleID = 't.c'